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Abstract
This paper documents large micro-heterogeneity and forecasting skill in the cross-section
of survey based bond risk premia. We reject informationally constrained rational expecta-
tions but show a learning model distorted by sentiment is consistent with the data. Aggre-
gating, we propose a belief measure for the marginal agent that is consistent with Fried-
man’s market selection hypothesis. This measure is available in real-time and compares
favourably to popular statistical models. Moreover, forecast errors from this measure,
while predictable, are not easily corrected in real-time. Finally, we re-assess structural
models and find support for both sentiment and time-varying quantity of risk channels.
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A large literature finds compelling evidence of predictability in several asset markets. A
stream of this literature interprets this result as evidence of a time-varying risk premium that
can be understood in the context of rational general equilibrium models. A second stream argues
that this predictability is driven by behavioural biases affecting the dynamics of subjective
beliefs, informational frictions, or both.
This paper sheds lights on the debate by exploiting a dataset that provides us with forecaster
specific expectations about U.S. Treasury bond yields, GDP and inflation to study the proper-
ties of subjective bond risk premia. The survey-based approach has a number of economic and
econometric advantages compared to the standard approach of inferring risk premia from pro-
jections of future return realizations on lagged state variables. Most importantly, survey-based
expectations of future excess returns are by construction model-free and forward-looking, and
thus provide us with a direct and real-time representation of investor expectations. This allows
us to address a series of questions related to agents rationality and the efficiency of markets in
aggregating beliefs.
We begin by constructing measures of subjective bond risk premia (EBR) from professional
market participants’ expectations of future yields. Using forecaster specific data, we study the
cross-sectional properties of agents’ beliefs on bond risk premia and study the extent to which
beliefs satisfy full-information rational expectations (FIRE) restrictions. The availability of
individual level data is especially important in this context since it is well known that consensus
regressions are inconsistent in presence of micro-heterogeneity. For example, if individual agents
are rational but have access to different signals, rational expectation tests based on consensus
beliefs can lead to over-rejection of the null of rationality (Figlewski and Wachtel (1983)).
Inconsistency can also go in the opposite direction if agents form heterogeneous irrational
forecasts since errors would tend to be averaged out in a consensus regression, thus leading to
excessive acceptance of the rational expectation hypothesis (Zellner (1962), Keane and Runkle
(1990), and Bonham and Cohen (2001)). We also use the properties of the link between
individual forecast errors and forecast revisions to learn about alternative expectation models,
such as noisy rational expectations, sticky information, and information neglect.1
1Many authors have employed consensus forecasts to rational expectations. A non-exhaustive list includes Ang,
Bekaert, and Wei (2007) and Aiolfi, Capistran, and Timmermann (2011) for macro quantities, Frankel and Froot (1987)
for exchange rates, Froot (1989) and Cieslak (2017) for interest rates, Bacchetta, Mertens, and Van Wincoop (2009) and
Greenwood and Schleifer (2014) for equity, and Koijen, Schmeling, and Vrugt (2015) for multiple asset classes.
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When agents hold heterogeneous beliefs, an important issue is how competitive markets
aggregate individual beliefs in those of the marginal investor.2 In the empirical literature,
a common approach is to proxy subjective beliefs with consensus expectations, in which all
agents have the same weight. In some cases, this choice is imposed by data limitations, but in
the context of asset pricing this is tantamount to assuming that all agents affect prices with
equal weights, including those with irrational beliefs. Friedman (1953) and Alchian (1950)
argue instead that market selection in competitive markets is a powerful force affecting the
characteristics of the representative agent. Those agents that are consistently more accurate
than others should accumulate more economic weight in the pricing kernel. Their argument is
a compelling reminder to many behavioural studies: instances of irrationality at the individual
level do not necessarily imply that the representative agent is irrational and market prices
inefficient. We proxy for the beliefs of the representative agent by ranking agents according
to their past accuracy and studying the spanning properties of this measure versus measures
generated by alternative aggregators. Five sets of empirical results emerge.
First, we document a large unconditional heterogeneity in the cross-section of EBRs. The
mean forecaster EBR is 1.06% for 10-year bonds, while the mean of the first quartile is neg-
ative at −1.66%, which implies that these agents believe long-term bonds are hedges against
economic shocks rather than risky bets on future economic states. We also find clear evidence
of persistence in agent-specific bond risk premia. For example, a forecaster in the first quartile
of the cross-sectional distribution of 2-year EBR has a probability of about 75% to stay in the
first quartile the following month, and this probability is about 74% for the 10-year EBR. This
is three times what it should be under the null hypothesis of no persistence.
Second, professional forecasters are reasonably accurate. The slope coefficient of predictive
regressions of bond excess returns on their ex-ante subjective expectations is on average positive,
contrary to what Greenwood and Schleifer (2014) document in the context of stock markets.
However, most forecasters tend to under-predict excess bond returns, which is an indication
of a rejection of the null hypothesis of FIRE at the individual level. Despite this bias, a
2Important empirical contributions to the literature on belief heterogeneity include Malmendier and Nagel (2011),
Das, Kuhnen, and Nagel (2017), Patton and Timmermann (2010) and Andrade, Crump, Eusepi, and Moench (2014).
Structural models that include a role of belief heterogeneity include Detemple and Murthy (1994), Hong and Stein (2003),
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Basak (2005), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), David (2008), Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2008),
Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Bhamra and Uppal (2014), Xiong and Yan (2010), Jouini, Marin, and Napp (2010),
Ehling, Gallmeyer, Heyerdahl-Larsen, and Illeditsch (2018), and Borovicka (2011).
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large fraction of professional forecasters are reasonably good relative to several econometric
benchmark models estimated in real-time and the ranking in their accuracy is persistent over
time. When we investigate in further detail the identities of the top forecasters, we find that
primary dealers are more likely to be among the top forecasters of the short-term interest rate
but they are not significantly better than other institutions in forecasting long-term bonds
returns.3 The lack of a strong rank correlation in the distribution of forecasters for long and
short-term bonds is a strong indication that the main determinant of long-term bond returns
predictability is not the predictability of short-term interest rates but the time variation in
bond risk premia.
Third, we consider alternative models of expectation formation that might explain the re-
jection of FIRE at the individual level and the persistent heterogeneity in beliefs with different
levels of accuracy.4 An important set of models assume that agents hold rational expecta-
tions but are subject to information frictions (Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015)). A testable
implication of these models is that individuals forecast errors are not correlated with their con-
temporaneous forecast revisions. Empirically, we find that the slope coefficients of regressions
of forecast errors on forecast revisions are significantly negative for almost all agents. This is
inconsistent with informationally-constrained rationality, including both noisy rational expec-
tations and sticky information models. On the other hand, we show that the negative sign
is consistent with models in which agents neglect information in forming their beliefs. This
bias induces a deviation between the beliefs of agents and those of the econometrician, which
Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) define as sentiment. We propose an empirical proxy for
sentiment and find evidence of a systematic component that is correlated across agents and
affects both expectations of bond yields and economic growth.
Fourth, we study the conjecture of Friedman (1953) and Alchian (1950) that competition
in financial markets washes away the impact of irrational beliefs in the pricing measure. We
construct, at any point in time t, the average beliefs of the agents who were most accurate up to
time t, which we denote EBR?t . Consistent with Friedman (1953), we find that EBR
?
t has better
spanning properties of contemporaneous bond prices than other aggregators, which highlights
3Primary dealers are trading counter-parties of the New York Fed in its implementation of monetary policy and are
also expected to make markets for the New York Fed on behalf of its official accountholders as needed.
4Contributions studying deviations from full information rational expectations include Mankiw and Reis (2002),
Woodford (2002), Sims (2003), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), Dovern, Fritsche, Loungani, and Tamirisa (2015),
and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009).
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the important role of competitive markets in aggregating beliefs. If market competition were
able to filter out irrational beliefs perfectly, prediction errors associated to EBR?t should be
orthogonal to any public information available at time t. We find instead statistical evidence
against orthogonality, which suggests that market competition is not sufficiently effective in
penalizing biases. Interestingly, however, when we investigate the economic significance of this
predictability, we find that most attempts to use public information to correct the biases in
real time are not economically significant. The most effective correction is obtained from the
average forecast errors over rolling windows and reduces the root mean squared error of the
forecast by about 13% for the 10-year bond. This is consistent with a dogmatic persistent
deviation from the econometrician’s beliefs even at the level of the marginal agent.
Finally, we propose an application of EBR? that relates to an extensive macro-finance
literature that studies the dynamics of bond risk premia.5 We revisit the literature by replacing
future average returns with EBR?t , which is forward looking and available in real-time. An
important finding is that several traditional structural models perform quite well under this
metric. In particular, models that argue about the importance of the quantity of risk channel
generate large R2 with loadings on risk factor proxies that are consistent with predictions from
theory. Moreover, we also include our measure of sentiment, to control for the bias in the
marginal agent’s expectations, and we show that sentiment is always statistically significantly
linked to subjective risk premia and largely increases the predictive power of structural models.
This results highlight the importance of both behavioural and rational elements in driving bond
risk premia.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents the data. Section II investigates the
accuracy of forecasters. Section III considers alternative channels of expectation formation.
Section IV addresses the question of beliefs aggregation. Section V conducts tests of rationality
on our proxy for the beliefs of the representative agent. Section VI uses EBR? to evaluate the
performance of structural models of expected bond risk premia. Section VII concludes.
5Duffee (2013) surveys the literature on the determinants of bond risk premia and concludes that most macro models
are not very successful empirically. Structural contributions on the dynamics of risk premia include Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) and Wachter (2006) for habit preferences; Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013)
for preference for resolution of uncertainty and long-run risks; Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Buraschi and Whelan
(2017)) for belief heterogeneity. General predictions that links quantities of risk to compensation for risk date back to
Merton (1980), French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), and Duffee (2002).
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I. The Cross Section of Subjective Bond Risk Premia
A. Data
We construct real-time measures of subjective bond risk premia directly from professional mar-
ket participants’ expectations regarding future yields for the sample period January 1988 to
July 2015. The BlueChip Financial Forecasts (BCFF) is a monthly survey providing extensive
panel data on the expectations of professional economists working at leading financial insti-
tutions about all maturities of the yield curve and economic fundamentals, such as GDP and
inflation. In our analysis we use agent specific forecasts for the Federal Funds rate, Treasury
bills with maturities 3-months/6-months, Treasury notes with maturities 1, 2, 5, 10-years, and
the 30-year Treasury bond. The contributors are asked to provide point forecasts at horizons
that range from the end of the current quarter to 5 quarters ahead (6 from January 1997).
BCFF represents the most extensive dataset currently available to investigate the role of
expectations formation in asset pricing.6 It is unique with respect to alternative commonly
studied surveys along at least four dimensions. First, the dataset provides the identity of the
forecasters. This allows us to track each individual in the cross section and time series.7 Indeed,
most of our questions could not be addressed using datasets with pre-aggregated data. Second,
the dataset is available at a monthly frequency, while other surveys, such as the Survey of
Professional Forecasters’ (SPF) is available only at quarterly frequency. This increases the
power of asset pricing tests. Third, the number of participants in the survey is large and stable
over time. In our sample it is 42 on average, with a standard deviation of about 2.3. Moreover,
it never falls below 35, and even considering only the forecasters who contribute to the sample
for at least 5 years (60 monthly observations) the number of participants is always above 30.
On the other hand, in the SPF the distribution of respondents displays significant variability:
the mean number of respondents is around 40, the standard deviation is 13 and in some years
the number of contributors is as low as 9. While in the early 70s the number of SPF forecasters
was around 60, it decreased in two major steps in the mid 1970s and mid 1980s to as low as
14 forecasters in 1990.8 Fourth, Bluechip has always been administered by the same agency,
6Other studies that use BlueChip include Piazzesi, Salomao, and Schneider (2015) and Cieslak (2017), who study
consensus bond risk premia and fed fund rates, respectively. Chernov and Mueller (2012), Andrade, Crump, Eusepi, and
Moench (2014) and Buraschi and Whelan (2017) use GDP expectations from BCFF.
7Forecasters are identified by institution’s name. For example, ‘J.P. Morgan’ or ‘Goldman Sachs’ or ‘Fannie Mae’.
8If one restricts the attention to forecasters who participated to at least 8 surveys, this limits the number of data
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while other surveys, such as SPF, have been administered by different agencies over the years.
Moreover, SPF changed some of the questions in the survey, and some of these changes crucially
affected the forecasting horizon.9 Finally, the survey is conducted in a short window of time,
between the 25th and 27th of the month and mailed to subscribers within the first 5 days of
the subsequent month. This allows the empirical analysis to be unaffected by biases induced
by staleness or overlapping observations between returns and responses.
One complication of BCFF forecasts is that while surveys are conducted on a monthly basis
the projections are reports on a future quarter calendar cycle so that the forecast horizon varies
each month. For example, in January, April, July and October a 12-month ahead and 15-month
ahead forecast is reported, whereas in March, June, September and December a 10-month ahead
and 13-month ahead forecast is reported. To construct a j-quarter ahead constant maturity
forecast we linearly interpolate along adjacent horizons for 2nd and 3rd months in the cycle.
To obtain curves of expected zero coupon discount rates we estimate a Nelson-Siegel model
on individual agent subjective par-yield forecasts. The Nelson-Siegel model assumes that the
instantaneous forward rate is given by a 3-factor parametric function.10 We calculate the
term structures using all available maturities (including 30-year Treasury yield forecasts) and
obtain a monthly panel data of expected constant time-to-maturity zero coupon (continuously
compounded) discount rates. Holding periods are quarterly up to 1.25-years (in what follows
we focus on 1-year excess returns) for bond maturities evenly spaced between 1 and 10-years
(we disregard maturities greater than 10-years). Over the whole sample there are 97 forecasters
for which we can compute the whole expected term structure of zero-coupon yields and on
average they contribute to the cross-section for about 138 months. Of these 97 forecasters, 84
participate to the panel for at least 5 years, and on average they contribute to the cross section
for about 154 months.
Given information on individual expectations about the cross-section of future interest rates,
BCFF allows us to compute individual subjective risk premia as follows. Let pnt be the logarithm
points considerably.
9For a detailed discussion on the issues related to SPF, see D’Amico and Orphanides (2008) and Giordani and
Soderlind (2003).
10To estimate the set of parameters we minimize the weighted sum of the squared deviations between actual and
model-implied prices. Specifically, we search for the parameters which solve bjt = arg minb
∑Hjt
h=1
[(
Ph (b)− Pht
)× 1
Dht
]2
,where Hjt denotes the number of bonds available by forecaster j in month t, P
h (b) is the model-implied price for bond
h = 1, ..., Hjt , P
h
t is its expected bond price, and D
h
t is the corresponding Macaulay duration.
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of the time-t price of a risk-free zero-coupon bond that pays one unit of the numeraire n-years
in the future. Spot yields are then defined as ynt = −p
n
t
n
. The realized excess log return from
holding the n-years bond from date t to t+h is rxnt+h = r
n
t+h−hyht , with the gross return being
defined as rnt+h = p
n−h
t+h − pnt . In the analysis the follows, we focus on a 1-year holding periods
indicated by h = 1.
The individual expected bond excess return (EBR) of agent i at one-year horizon for a
bond maturity n is defined as erxni,t ≡ Eit
[
rxnt+1
]
. Using survey forecasts on Eit
[
yn−1t+1
]
we can
compute the implied cross-section of EBR as erxni,t = E
i
t
[
pn−1t+1
]−pnt −y1t since from the surveys
we directly observe Eit
[
yn−1t+1
]
erxni,t = −(n− 1)×Eit
[
yn−1t+1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Survey Yield
Forecasts
+nynt − y1t (1)
For realized bond data we use zero-coupon bond yields provided by Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2006) which are available from the Federal Reserve website.
B. Belief Heterogeneity
Figure 1 takes a first look at the data. The top panel plots quartiles (Q1, Q2(median) and Q3) of
the cross-sectional distribution of subjective expected excess returns on a 10-year bond with 1-
year horizon. We find that, consistent with the predictions of many structural models, subjective
bond risk premia are countercyclical: they are negatively correlated with expectations about
real growth. For example, expected returns are increasing in the early part of the sample,
decreasing in the high growth rate years between the dot-com bubble and the financial crisis,
and spiking again around Lehman Brother collapse.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
We also document large unconditional heterogeneity in the cross section of EBR forecasts.
The median (Q2) forecaster EBR is 1.06% for 10-year bonds. However, the first and third
quartiles (Q1 and Q3) are -1.66% and +3.57% for the same maturity, respectively. This implies
that while the consensus believes in a positive risk premium, a significant fraction of investors
believe in a negative bond risk premium.11
11Table I in the Supplemental Appendix provides summary statistics for the median, the first quartile, and the third
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The conditional properties of the cross-sectional distribution of EBR display rich dynamics
in the time series and there exists significant time-varying heterogeneity around the consensus
forecast. The bottom panel of Figure 1 highlights the time variation in heterogeneity by plotting
the cross-sectional standard deviation of EBR standardized by the full sample mean EBR, for
bond maturities 2, 5 and 10-year. The figure also shows that the dispersion in beliefs is state-
dependent: it tends to rise at the onset of recessionary periods and drop again as the economy
recovers.12 Also, disagreement is non-monotonic in maturity displaying a ‘hump shape’ around
the 5-year maturity.13
These observations demonstrate the existence of micro-heterogeneity, which implies that
FIRE cannot be tested using aggregate data or panel regressions with common coefficients.
C. Belief Persistence
Disagreement about short rates, bond returns, and the macro economy are all persistent. This
raises an interesting question: is disagreement a result of dogmatic beliefs, information frictions,
or both? In order to address this question we first rank all forecasters according to whether in a
given month t their forecast is in the first, second, third or fourth quartile of the cross-sectional
distribution. We repeat this exercise for all months in the sample and compute transition
probabilities, i.e. the probability that forecasters in a given quartile at time t stay in that
particular quartile the following month or move to a different quartile of the distribution.
We do this first for short rate forecasts in the left panel of Table I.14 If views are not
persistent, all the entries in these transition matrix should be approximately equal to 25%.
Instead, we find that the diagonal elements are significantly higher than 25%, in particular for
the most extreme quantiles, Q1 and Q4 where they are always above 70%.15
quartile of the (1-year) EBR distribution for the 2, 5 and 10-year bonds.
12The counter-cyclicality of the dispersion in beliefs is consistent with the empirical evidence in Patton and Timmer-
mann (2010) and Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2014), among others.
13We also find that disagreement about long term bond excess returns is more than ten times larger than disagreement
about short rates or disagreement about the macro economy, see bottom right panel of Figure 1 in the Supplemental
Appendix.
14Supplemental Appendix B then investigates whether expected term structures are consistent with agents’ expec-
tations about future economic fundamentals. We show that agents who are marginally more optimistic or pessimistic
about macroeconomic variables are consistently in one particular quartile of the cross-sectional distribution of short-term
interest rates.
15This result is striking and even stronger than what Patton and Timmermann (2010) document for macroeconomic
forecasts using data from the Consensus Economics Inc, at a quarterly frequency. Transition matrices for GDP and CPI
growth expectations show very similar results and are available from the authors upon request.
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[Insert Table I here.]
The middle and right panels of Table I show the transition matrices for subjective excess
returns on 2 and 10-year bonds, respectively. The results show that forecasters have highly
persistent beliefs about bond risk premia. For example, a forecaster in the first quartile of the
cross-sectional distribution of 2-year EBR has a probability of 75% to stay in the first quartile
the following month, and this probability is 74% for the 10-year EBR, which is about three
times what it should be under the null hypothesis of no persistence. In all cases, the probability
of remaining in the same quartile is significantly higher than 25% at a significance level of 5%.16
The question of belief persistence is particularly interesting in the context of bond pricing
models since whether agents are persistently optimistic or pessimistic about bond risk pre-
mia is related to agents’ perception about bonds being hedging assets or rather risky bets on
consumption (inflation) risk.
II. Long-Term Bond Predictability
In this section, first we investigate the accuracy of professional forecasters and document the
extent of persistence (if any) in the forecasting ability for long-term bonds returns. Since long-
term bond returns are affected by both changes in short-term interest rates and bond risk
premia, we investigate the extent to which skill in forecasting short-term rates can translate
into superior ability to forecast long-term bond returns.
A. Accuracy of professional forecasters
To assess the accuracy and the degree of heterogeneity in the cross section, we first run a simple
predictive regression of realized excess returns on subjective EBRs, for each single contributor
i to the BCFF panel, focusing on the contributors with at least 5 years (60 months) of forecasts
for bonds with maturity n and forecast horizon h = 1 year:
rxnt+1 = α
n
i + β
n
i erx
n
i,t + 
n
i,t+1. (2)
16Even at an annual instead of monthly frequency, the probability of remaining in the same quartile is significantly
higher than 25%. For example, a forecaster in the first (fourth) quartile of the cross-sectional distribution of 10-year
EBR has a probability of 45% (42%) to be in the first quartile the following year.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of individual regression coefficients and R2 of regression
(2) for a 10-year bond. Despite the heterogeneity in accuracy, a few forecasters are extremely
accurate with slope coefficients close to one and R2 larger than 20%. The correlation between
expectations and future realization of excess bond returns is positive for 69 out of 84 forecasters.
The coefficient β10i is significantly positive at 5% level for 30 agents and significantly negative
for only two. This mostly positive relation between expectations and realizations is the opposite
to what Greenwood and Schleifer (2014) document in the context of the stock market, and to
what Koijen, Schmeling, and Vrugt (2015) find in the context of global equities, currencies and
global fixed income returns across countries.17 This may be due either to issues related to the
measurement error and aggregation in survey data or to the fact that bond returns are easier
to predict than equities, due to the absence of uncertainty about future nominal cash-flows.
Alternatively, it is possible that professional forecasters are simply better than retail investors
and consumers, due to professional incentives and access to superior information.
Despite the positive correlation with future realized returns, forecasters’ beliefs still display
some potential signs of irrationality in their level. In fact, the α10i coefficient in regression
(2) is positive for 82 out of 84 agents and significant at 5% level for 71 agents, meaning that
forecasters tend to underpredict excess bond returns.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
We further study forecast accuracy at the level of each individual forecaster i by computing
their root mean squared errors
RMSEni (Survey) =
√
1
Ti
∑
t∈τi
(
rxnt+1 − erxni,t
)2
,
for bond maturity n = 10 years, where τi is the set of Ti dates in which forecaster i
contributes to the panel. The individual RMSEs range between 5.30 and 15.83. Since individual
forecasters appear in the sample at different times, we assess their accuracy relative to two
benchmark models.
17Koijen, Schmeling, and Vrugt (2015) also find that survey expectations of returns negatively predict future returns
in the time series in three major asset classes: global equities, currencies, and global fixed income. However, instead of
looking at the slope coefficient of predictive regressions, they show this by building a survey-based portfolio strategy.
The strategy goes a dollar long or short in country i in month t when the consensus forecast is above or below a certain
threshold, which is set to be equal to the middle value World Economic Survey respondents can select.
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Our first benchmark model is the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) return forecasting factor,
which is a tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates that has been claimed to subsume
the information contained in the term structure. However, the in-sample predictive content
of the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor relies on estimates for factor loadings that were not available
in real time.18 Therefore, we construct a real-time version of the CP factor: we initialise a
CP with 10-years of data from January 1978 to January 1988 via a two stage projection of
forward spreads.19 Then, using an expanding window we estimate factor loadings using realized
returns available 1-year ago, and apply these to date t forward spreads to construct a date t
predicting factor: CP (t).20 Using this real-time CP (t) factor we proceed with an out-of-sample
assessment. Our second, more parsimonious, benchmark is the implied forecast by the slope
of the yield curve, defined as the 10-year yield minus the 1-year yield. This forecast requires
computing a single factor loading (the beta on the slope), which we estimate in real-time in the
same way that we estimate factor loadings on CP (t), using the same initialisation period and
same rolling window length.21
Table II presents root mean square prediction errors for 10-year bond excess returns, based
on forecasts from the unconditional top 10 forecasters (BEST), the bottom 10 forecasters
(WORST), and the arithmetic average of the cross-section of forecasters for each prediction
date t (CONS), i.e. the consensus.22 The top panel reports RMSEs for all months in the
sample period while the bottom panel excludes the zero lower bound period, i.e. January 2009
to July 2015. Focusing on the performance of surveys, we see large heterogeneity between the
best and worst forecasters and this dispersion in skill persists when excluding the zero lower
bound (ZLB) period. Also, we find evidence of state dependence: when we distinguish between
recessions and expansions we show that all agents are much better at forecasting returns in
18For example, the coefficients of the ‘tent-shaped’ factor used to forecast returns in the 1990s uses information available
during the 2000s. In real time the shape of the factor loadings on the forward curve displays time variation (see, e.g.,
Bauer and Hamilton (2015)). One should also be concerned with any regression where the right hand variables have a
root very close to unity, such as the first stage Cochrane-Piazzesi regression.
19Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) advocate the use of forward spreads (n-year forward rates minus the 1-year yield)
instead of forward rates to remove spurious level effects. Indeed, in unreported results we find a real time CP con-
structed from the level of forward rates contains a bias, presumably because of the trend in interest rates in our sample.
Constructing CP from spreads significantly improves its out-of-sample performance.
20The out of sample projection also requires estimating the relationship between CP (t) and expected returns on n-year
bonds, which we estimate using only information that was available in real-time.
21In the context of equity returns, Goyal and Welch (2008) document significant differences of in-sample versus out-
of-sample performances of several well-known models.
22Top and bottom 10 forecasters are identified by looking at the average accuracy ranking percentiles, Ri defined
below, over the full sample.
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bad times, consistent with the idea that the dynamics of interest rates are dominated by risk
premia in these periods. For example, in the full sample the RMSE for the top ten forecasters
drops from 7.75 to 5.15 but also the RMSE for the worst forecasters drops, from 10.56 to 8.19.
Next, compare surveys to our benchmark models. In the full sample, both CONS and BEST
outperform real-time CP and this holds in recessions and expansions, including and excluding
the ZLB period. However, we also find that real-time forecasts implied by Slope always out-
performing CP . In the full sample, the RMSEs from the Slope forecasts are almost identical to
BEST and better than the consensus. However, the relatively strong performance of the Slope
is mainly driven by large forecast errors made by surveys in the ZLB period. Excluding this
period, even the consensus is beating Slope with RMSE equal to 7.98 compared to 8.11 for the
Slope.
Next, we compare individual agent survey forecasts, out-of-sample by construction, to these
benchmark models by computing a measure of relative performance Ani for the periods in which
agents are present in the panel:
Ani =
RMSEni (Survey)
RMSEn(Model)
. (3)
Values smaller than one imply better performance under the subjective measure. Figure 3
presents the histogram for the cross section of Ani , for bond maturity n equal to 10 years. We
find that an important fraction of survey forecasters outperform these benchmark models. For
the CP model in the full-sample around 40% of the forecasters have Ani < 1. At the same time,
we find that about a fifth of forecasters have Ani > 1.2, thus producing forecasts significantly
worse than the CP model. Compared to the Slope forecast, a large fraction of the distribution
lies between 1.00 and 1.20 for the full sample, indicating that most agents are slightly worse.
However, consistent with the discussion above this is driven by large errors during the ZLB
period. Excluding this period around 40% of the agents in the cross section outperform a Slope
forecast.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
Given the large heterogeneity in survey expectations it might not be surprising that there is
evidence of accuracy in the cross section, but what is surprising is that this accuracy tends to
be persistent. Since forecasters contribution to the survey can occur at different time periods,
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to quantify the persistence we first compute the squared forecast error at each time t. Then we
calculate the percentiles of these squared errors for each forecaster, that we call accuracy ranking
percentiles, Ri,t, and we compute the time average Ri of these percentiles. Low percentiles
correspond to greater accuracy. We repeat this exercise for all months t in the sample and
compute transition probabilities, defined as the probability that forecasters in a given quartile
at time t stay in that particular quartile the following month or move to a different quartile
of the distribution. If accuracy were not persistent, all the entries in the middle panel of
Table III should be approximately equal to 25%. We find instead that the diagonal elements
are significantly higher than 25%, especially for the most extreme quantiles, Q1 and Q4. For
example, a forecaster in the first quartile of the cross-sectional distribution of 10-year EBR
accuracy has a probability of 58% to stay in the first quartile of accuracy the following month.
This probability is 70% for the 4th quartile, which contains the worst forecasters, suggesting that
bad forecasters produce more persistently poor forecasts, even more so than good forecasters.
[Insert Table III here.]
Summarising, two conclusions emerge. First, expectations of a significant fraction of pro-
fessional forecasters are rather good even with respect to popular fixed income models, and not
as bad as previously reported. At the same time, while professional forecasts can be used to
build reliable measures of bond risk premia, one needs to be mindful of the heterogeneity in
the distribution of these beliefs. Second, both good and bad accuracy is persistent.
B. Short-rate vs long-rate accuracy
A natural question to ask is ‘does the superior predictive power that some forecasters display for
long-term predictions originate from their ability to predict short-term rates?’. This question
relates to the important issue of whether the dynamics of long term interest rates is driven by
variation in expected short rates (cash-flow channel) or risk premia (discount rate channel).
To test the hypothesis that the ability to predict long-term bond returns comes from skill
in forecasting short rates, we compare the long-term accuracy percentiles for the 10-year bond
with the corresponding accuracy percentiles for the 3-month yield, denoted R3mi,t . First, the
left panel of Table III shows that, similar to long-term bonds, accuracy (good and bad) in
predicting short rates tends to be persistent. The two rankings are correlated: a regression of
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the 10-year accuracy percentiles on the 3-month accuracy has a significant slope coefficient of
0.42 and an adjusted R-squared of 21%. The right panel of Table III summarizes the conditional
distribution of forecast accuracy for the 10-year EBR given the 3-month yield accuracy. The
elements on the diagonal show the existence of a link between the two accuracies. However, the
rank correlation of the accuracy percentiles on the 3-month yield and the 10-year EBR is far
from perfect. Only 34% of the top short-rate forecasters are also top long-term yield forecasters.
To investigate in further detail the link between short-rate and long-term bond predictability,
we take advantage of the knowledge of the specific identity of each individual forecaster. Which
institutions are especially good at predicting short-term interest rates and long-term bond
returns? The answer is summarized in Table IV, which shows the top ten forecasters in terms
of average percentiles of squared forecast errors for 10-year bond excess returns (left panel)
versus short rates (right panel). These lists show that most of the best forecasters for the
10-year bond excess returns are not in the top-ten list for the short-term rate. In fact, only
three institutions, i.e. Goldman Sachs, Nomura and RidgeWorth, are in both lists.
[Insert Table IV here.]
Interestingly, 6 out of the first 10 institutions in the list of top short-rate forecasters are
currently primary dealers, or have been primary dealers at least once in our sample period. This
is remarkable given that only 24 of the 84 institutions in the survey with at least 5 years of
contributions are or have been primary dealers.23 However, only three (UBS, Goldman Sachs,
and Nomura) of the top ten forecasters for the 10-year bond excess returns are primary dealers.
At the same time, financial institutions such as J.P. Morgan and BMO Capital Markets who can
forecast the short rate rather well, are poor performers at the long end of the term structure.
To formally analyze the relative performance of primary dealers versus non-primary dealers, for
short versus long-rate predictions, we test the null hypothesis that their accuracy percentiles
are drawn from the same distribution using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Unconditionally, for
10-year bond excess returns forecasts the p-value of the test is 68.2%. Even after distinguishing
periods of increasing and decreasing rates or using the Mann-Whitney test, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis with p-values larger than 50%. Conducting the same test for short-rate
forecasts we always reject the null at the 5% level. Thus, primary dealers have a significantly
23The list of primary dealers at every point in time can be obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank website.
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better predictive performance only for the short rate.24 This might be explained by primary
dealers having specific information about (or better models to interpret) monetary policy.25
Nonetheless, even this advantage does not easily translate into an advantage to forecast long-
term bond returns. We conclude that an important component of the dynamics of expected
bond returns at longer maturities is a risk premium term, which is not completely revealed by
the dynamics of short-term interest rates.
III. Beyond the Line of FIRE
The large and persistent differences in predictive performance highlighted in the previous section
raise the question of what drives the heterogeneity in forecasters’ accuracy and beliefs. In this
section we consider alternative channels of expectation formation.
Two important stream of the literature investigate economies with rational but sticky-
information (Mankiw and Reis (2002)) and with rational but noisy-information (Woodford
(2002), Sims (2003), and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009)). In the first case, agents update
their information sets infrequently as a result of a fixed costs of information acquisition and
the degree of information rigidity is the probability of not acquiring new information each
period. When agents are subject to noisy information, they rationally update their beliefs
but, since they can never fully observe the true state, they use an optimal signal-extraction
filter. If one were to aggregate these expectations, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) show
that average forecast errors are predictable by forecast revisions. They use data on consensus
inflation expectations and find that, at the aggregate level, forecast revisions (positively) predict
forecast errors. As they highlight, however, “the predictability of the average ex-post forecast
errors across agents using ex-ante forecast revisions is an emergent property of the aggregation
across individuals, not a property of the individual forecasts.” Indeed, in both cases, to the
extent that agents expectations are rational, even in the presence of information constraints
ex-post forecast errors should continue to be unpredictable at the individual level. To avoid the
potential confounding effect of aggregation, we study informationally constrained rationality
by directly using individual level data. For each single contributor i to the BCFF panel, we
24See also Section C of the Supplemental Appendix for an analysis of the dynamics of 3-month yield forecast accuracy.
25Alternative explanations are linked to accuracy about economic fundamentals and order flow information on short-
term bonds. We describe them and test the first of these hypotheses in Section D of the Supplemental Appendix.
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run the following regression and test H0 : b
i,n = 0:
FEi,nt,t+1 = a
i,n + bi,nFRi,nt + 
i,n
t+1, (4)
where FEi,nt,t+1 = rx
n
t+1− erxni,t denotes the forecast error of forecaster i for the excess return of
a bond with maturity n and FRni,t is its forecast revision, computed as the difference between
its time-t forecast and the same forecast made the previous month.26
Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows the distribution of individual t-statistics of the slope coefficients
bi,n in regression (4), for the 10-year excess bond returns (n = 10 years), focusing on the 84
contributors with at least 60 monthly forecasts. The forecast revision coefficient is negative for
all but one agent, and significantly so for 80 out of 84 forecasters, at the 5% level.
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
At the individual level, models of information frictions imply orthogonality between forecast
updates and forecast errors. This is inconsistent with our finding of a mostly negative and
significant slope coefficient in regression (4). These results clearly suggest that not only we can
reject a full-information version of the rational expectation hypothesis, but also explanations
based on the role of information rigidities, such as sticky or noisy information.27
The finding is potentially consistent with more behavioural models of expectation forma-
tion. One example are models in which forecasters have asymmetric loss functions and are
heterogeneous in their degree of loss-aversion (Capistran and Timmermann (2009)).28 A second
example are models that induce forecasters to smooth their predictions due to overconfidence
or to avoid giving the impression of lack of confidence in their beliefs. Similar to heterogeneity
in loss aversion, forecast smoothing makes forecast errors predictable even in absence of infor-
mation frictions. Finally, the result could be due to biases in beliefs and the specific properties
of their dynamics. To directly explore this third explanation, we investigate the implications of
a model with noisy information when expectations are biased by the statistical neglect of useful
information. Suppose that xt is the (hidden) state of the economy and yt is the variable that
26Results are very similar when using forecast revisions of long-term yields at quarterly frequency.
27We also find that the negative slope coefficient is mainly due to the dynamics of bond risk premia, as opposed to the
dynamics of short term interest rates.
28A simple model with asymmetries in the forecasters’ cost of over- and under-predictions on the lines of Capistran
and Timmermann (2009) is also consistent with the systematic bias in forecast errors and the persistence in the ranking
of forecasts and forecast errors in the cross section.
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the agent is trying to forecast, such as the bond yield. The true yield depends on two factors,
i.e. xt and zt, but the agent ignores zt and forms expectations only based on xt. If zt 6= 0,
agents expectation are biased. Assume the following simple AR(1) dynamics for xt and zt:
xt+1 = a0 + a1xt + ε
x
t+1, (5)
zt+1 = b0 + b1zt + ε
z
t+1,
yt+1 = xt+1 + zt+1 + wt+1,
with xt+1 independent of zt+1 and [ε
x
t+1, ε
z
t+1, wt+1] being orthogonal zero-mean innovations. In
our context, zt is the difference between the econometrician and the agent’s forecasts of the
state of the economy, and can therefore be interpreted as a measure of sentiment.
Proposition 1. Let Ki be the individual-specific Kalman gain associated with the state-space
(5), and let FEit,t+1 and FR
i
t denote the forecast error and forecast revision of agent i about
yt+1, conditional on his information at time t. Then,
(i) Average forecast errors and average forecast revisions are proportional to average zt:
E
(
FEit,t+1
)
=
1− a1
1− a1(1−Ki)E (zt) and E(FR
i
t) =
a1(1− a1)Ki
1− a1(1−Ki)E(zt). (6)
(ii) The projection coefficient of FEit,t+1 on FR
i
t is
1
Ki
[
b1
a1
−Ki
]
;
(iii) At time t, if a1 > 0 then FR
i
t is positively related to zt−1, while FE
i
t,t+1 is positively related
to zt and negatively to zt−1.
Proof: See Section E of the Supplemental Appendix.
The proposition implies that the neglect of important information can introduce rich im-
plications for both the joint and marginal dynamics of forecast errors and forecast revisions.29
Forecast errors are predictable and the sign depends on b1
a1
relative to the Kalman gain Ki. Since
Ki < 1, it is positive when the persistence b1 of zt is larger than the persistence a1 of the state
29The model-implied expressions for the Bayesian update of the latent state (See Section E of the Supplemental
Appendix) resemble the case of diagnostic expectations in Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2018), in which agents
overstate the impact of news by the multiplicative factor. However, in our setting there is also a bias in the perceived
prediction error, that includes the current level of sentiment and the difference between the agent’s estimated state and
the econometrician’s, which is a function of past levels of sentiment and past shocks.
17
variable xt. The opposite occurs when the state variable xt is significantly more persistent than
zt. We assume that individual agents are heterogeneous in their perceived persistence of the
latent state, ai1. This assumption implies a cross-section of regression coefficients in Equation
(4) which are negatively linked to ai1.
Figure 4 shows that the slope coefficient of FEit,t+1 on FR
i
t are negative and FE
i
t,t+1 are
positively autocorrelated. These two results are potentially consistent with the existence of
neglected information at the individual level, with a dynamics characterized by a small b1/a1
ratio on average but a distribution of coefficients that is driven by the agent-specific state
persistence ai1.
Is the evidence of information neglect also systematic across agents? To investigate directly
this question, we construct a direct measure of forecaster’s sentiment. A growing asset pricing
literature that models heterogeneous beliefs in general equilibrium allows for a deviation of
agents beliefs about fundamental growth from the expectation of an unbiased econometrician.
Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009) refer to this process as sentiment. To study the link between
agent specific and systematic sentiment, we use agent-specific expectations on one-year GDP
growth, Eit (gdpt+1), and compare them to the expectation implied by a benchmark model,
E (gdpt+1|Mt). To compute one-year model forecasts under the econometrician measure Mt,
we borrow from the empirical macro-finance literature and use a time-series AR(4) model using
quarterly realized GDP growth (see, for instance, Marcellino (2008) and references therein).
Our measure of growth sentiment is then the difference between the survey and model-implied
expectation of GDP growth for the average agent: Sgdpt = Eit (gdpt+1) − E (gdpt+1|Mt), for i
equal to the consensus. Positive values of sentiment Sgdpt correspond to an average optimism
in subjective beliefs about growth with respect to an econometrician. Note that a positive
sentiment Sgdpt corresponds to a negative zt in the model above, whereby agents’ forecast of
yields is higher than the rational forecast xt + zt, or a positive zt if the observable variable
yt is the bond return instead of the level of yields, as in our regression (4), since if agents
over-predict yields they under-predict bond returns. Our sentiment proxy Sgdpt is significantly
positive on average, with a sample mean of around 0.37% and has an autocorrelation of about
0.58, which is lower than the persistence of individual expectations for the large majority of
agents, consistent with a small b1/a
i
1 ratio on average.
Does aggregate sentiment explain the bias in the forecast errors for long-term bond excess
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returns at the level of the individual forecasters? Panel (d) of Figure 4 shows the distribution
of individual t-statistics of the slope coefficients in regressions of the individual forecast errors
for the 10-year bond on our sentiment proxy:
FEi,10t,t+1 = a
i,10
s + b
i,10
s Sgdpt + 10i,t+1. (7)
The coefficient of sentiment is positive for 84% of the agents, and significant for around
one fourth of them at the 5% level. This suggests that in periods of positive sentiment, i.e.
optimism about fundamentals, most agents tend to under-predict excess long-term bond returns
and commit larger (positive) forecast errors. The result is consistent with Proposition 1.30
Moreover, as implied by (6) with E(zt) > 0, the time series average forecast error is positive for
the large majority (around 92%) of the agents, and we find a strong rank correlation of about
42% between the agents’ mean forecast errors and their regression coefficient in a projection
of forecast errors onto forecast revisions. This result is consistent with Proposition 1, which
implies that an agent with a large perceived persistence ai1 will have both a smaller E
(
FEit,t+1
)
and a more negative projection coefficient of FEit,t+1 on FR
i
t.
To summarize, the results suggest the existence of a systematic behavioral component in
agents beliefs, that is at least partially responsible for the statistical rejection of both FIRE and
noisy rational expectations hypotheses. Agents are optimistic on average in our sample (i.e.
sentiment tends to be positive) and this drives average positive forecast revisions and forecast
errors on bond excess returns. Moreover, the signs of the regression coefficients of forecast error
on forecast revisions, forecast error on sentiment, and forecast error on lagged forecast error are
mutually consistent with the existence of ignored information (sentiment) with positive (albeit
small) persistence.
IV. Belief aggregation and subjective bond risk premia
The extent of cross-sectional heterogeneity in beliefs raise a series of questions about how beliefs
should be aggregated to construct an empirical proxy of subjective bond risk premia for the
30Results are robust to the use of an alternative measure of sentiment St that is available monthly, based on 3-month
rate forecasts: St = Eit
(
y3mt+1
) − E (y3mt+1|Mt) for i equal to the consensus agent. This measure captures the average
optimism in subjective beliefs about short rates with respect to an econometrician, whose expectations are assumed to
follow a benchmark unit-root model.
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representative agent. The solution is far from trivial. It is common in the empirical literature
to use consensus expectations as a proxy of subjective beliefs. In some cases, the choice is
forced by data limitations. In the context of asset pricing, this is tantamount to assuming
that the marginal agent holds consensus beliefs. However, this is often inconsistent with the
implications of heterogeneous general equilibrium models, in which the beliefs of the marginal
agent deviate from consensus.
The general equilibrium literature that studies economies where trade is generated because
of heterogeneous beliefs argues that in absence of short-selling constraints irrational agents
eventually lose economic weight to the benefit of less biased agents.31 This argument, consistent
with the original “market selection hypothesis” by Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) implies
that bond prices should span the beliefs of the most accurate agents (i.e. closest to the actual
physical probability).32 If some agents have been consistently more accurate than others, they
would have been accumulating more economic weight in the pricing kernel. Thus, these beliefs,
rather than the consensus ones, should be a better proxy of the expectation of the marginal
agent. The “market selection hypothesis” has been used as a powerful theoretical arguments in
support of the efficient markets paradigm as this does not require that all agents are rational
in order for prices to reflect the true data generating process. While the argument is made
asymptotically, Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerfield (2006) show that even when agents with
inferior beliefs do not survive in the long run, their impact on prices can persist. Indeed,
although they are linked, survival and price impact are two distinct concepts. Kogan, Ross,
Wang, and Westerfield (2016) discuss the conditions on agent’s preferences in which agents who
fail to survive in the long run can still affect the prices of low-aggregate consumption states.33
To account for the potential link between market selection and price impact, we use infor-
mation on agents beliefs from both the time series and the cross section to build an alternative
aggregate measure of subjective bond risk premia. First, at every month t we sort agents ac-
31See, for example, Basak (2005), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), Jouini and Napp (2006), Xiong and Yan (2010), Chen,
Joslin, and Tran (2012), Buraschi and Whelan (2017), Ehling, Gallmeyer, Heyerdahl-Larsen, and Illeditsch (2018), among
others)
32Alchian (1950) argues “Realized profits [...] are the mark of success and viability. It does not matter through what
process of reasoning or motivation such success was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is sufficient. This is the
criterion by which the economic system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are the survivors; those who
suffer losses disappear. ”
33Additional important contributions on this topic include Yan (2008) who argue that it may take a long time to
effectively eliminate the impact of irrational investors. Moreover, even a slightly smaller time discount rates may lead
an irrational investor to dominate the market in the long run, even if his belief substantially and persistently deviates
from the truth.
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cording to the level of their accuracy up to that date. Specifically, we compute the average of
the accuracy ranking percentiles Ri,t up to t of all agents present in the panel at time t and
form portfolios of agents based on this past accuracy. Note that the realized forecast errors up
to time t will be based on expectations formed up to time t − 12 months, since we consider
forecasts with a fixed one year horizon. We use an initial window of 5 years. Then, we compute
the average EBR for different bond maturities for the agents in the top half of the accuracy
percentiles distribution at each time t. This is our preferred measure of aggregate subjective
bond risk premia, which we denote EBR?. This selection procedure has the advantage of being
in real time (it uses only past information), so it is not affected by look-ahead bias. We also
tried alternative simple aggregation schemes that place weight on the most accurate agents,
such as linear weights or a simple average of the top quartile, which generate quantitively sim-
ilar results. One could attempt a more sophisticated non-linear aggregation scheme to recover
the unobservable weights of the agents in the pricing kernel and test ex-post the difference in
the price impact of the most versus the least accurate agents. We decided instead to rely on
an aggregation scheme that is less arbitrary and sample dependent as possible and study its
properties.
When we compare the top 10 forecasters based on the average ex-ante (see Table V) and
unconditional performance rankings (see left panel of Table IV), we find that the intersection
of the two rankings is made of five out of ten forecasters. On the one hand, this shows that
aggregating beliefs using an ex-ante approach does matter; on the other hand, the persistence
in accuracy is such that the two rankings are highly correlated. It is also worth noting that the
institutions which are in the top ten ranking based on average accuracy percentile but not in
the top ten ranking based on the number of appearances in EBR?, like Huntington National
Bank and RidgeWorth Capital Management, tend to have a smaller number of observations
and are therefore naturally less likely to be selected on an ex-ante basis.34
[Insert Table V here.]
We find that EBR? is positively correlated to future realized excess returns and has lower
RMSE than the consensus. The correlation between EBR? and future realized returns is 15%
34EBR? can be computed for the sample that spans the period December 1993 - July 2015. In this period, Huntington
National Bank and RidgeWorth Capital Management contribute to the panel for a total of 85 and 76 months, respectively,
while for example Fannie Mae has 234 monthly contributions.
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and 13% for the 5 years and 10 years bond, respectively, and it increases to 40% and 33% in the
second half of the sample, i.e. from April 2003. The improvement in the predictive performance
of EBR? over time can be due to the fact that most of the top performers unconditionally (see
again the left panel of Table IV), like Thredgold, UBS and Goldman Sachs, start to contribute
to the BCFF panel only after 2000. In fact, in the last part of the sample we also observe larger
differences between the performances of EBR? and the consensus, suggesting that since the
beginning of the century it is particularly important to account for belief aggregation and select
the appropriate agents rather than simply taking the simple average of all agents’ expectations.
Figure 5 shows the time series of our EBR? measure against the corresponding realized
excess returns, for a 5-year (left panels) and a 10-year (right panels) bond.
[Insert Figure 5 here.]
It is clear from these figures that EBR? has a downward bias. The representative agent
tends to underestimate future excess bond returns as the subjective risk premium is almost
always below the unconditional mean of the realized excess return, denoted by the horizontal
dashed line in the graphs. This observation is consistent with the sentiment biased Kalman
filter results in section III.
A. Alternative Aggregators
The existence of frictions can affect the properties of the marginal agent’s SDF rather differently
than suggested by Friedman’s market selection hypothesis. Indeed, Harrison and Kreps (1978),
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong, Sraer, and Yu (2017) discuss economies in which
the equilibrium SDF is biased toward the beliefs of the optimist agent. Agents with negative
expectations about future returns are restricted from selling short, thus their beliefs do not
affect the properties of the equilibrium SDF. Individual level data allows us to investigate this
alternative aggregator as follows. We identify the beliefs of the unrestricted agents as those
with positive expected returns at any time t, and denote the average of their beliefs EBR+.
Then, we can directly compare the properties of EBR+ to those of EBR?. Depending on the
dynamics of agents beliefs, the number of agents used to obtain EBR+ changes over time as
well as their identities.
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Figure 6 compares the five-years rolling average R2 of a contemporaneous (spanning) re-
gression of EBR? and EBR+ on the term structure of bond prices. If short-selling constraints
are important, then EBR+ should be better explained by contemporaneous bond prices than
EBR?. In the period 2002-2009, until the start of quantitative easing and forward guidance,
we find that the rolling R2 of EBR? is significantly greater that the R2 produced by EBR+.
Interestingly, prior to 2002, EBR? and EBR+ are broadly equivalent. On the one hand, this
may support the interpretation of the existence of binding short-selling constraints during that
period. However, one may also notice that in the five year period ending in 2002, Treasury
bond market optimists should have accumulated significant capital gains as the effective Fed
fund rate dropped from 5.50% (October 1997) to 1.74% (February 2001). A similar observation
applies in the period after 2009, when the two R2 are not very different. Even during this
period, the Fed aggressively reduced interest rates using both conventional and unconventional
policies.
[Insert Figure 6 here.]
Overall, these results suggest that EBR? is an attractive empirical proxy of expected bond
risk premia, for several reasons. It is genuinely ex-ante, contrary to other ex-post measures.
Moreover, it penalises inaccurate agents which is consistent with the spirit of the market se-
lection hypothesis in competitive markets by Friedman (1953) and Alchian (1950). Finally, it
performs well against (and is correlated with) popular forecasting models purely based on price
information.
V. Marginal Agent’s Beliefs
In the first part of the paper, we show that individual agents expectations deviates from FIRE.
Nonetheless, Friedman’s conjecture is that markets may still be able to aggregate information
and beliefs efficiently by allocating dynamically resources to the least biased agents. In what
follows, we use our measure of EBR?t as a proxy for the subjective bond risk premium of the
representative agent to investigate the extent to which markets are able to filter out individual
biases that might be present at the individual level.
First, we form forecast errors on bond excess returns from the difference between future
realized and expected excess returns, FEnt,t+1 = rx
n
t,t+1 − EBR?n,t. Then, we investigate the
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extent to which FEnt,t+1 are predictable by information available at time t. If markets are able
to aggregate all information at time t and cure the existence of individual biases in beliefs
reported earlier, then any public information at time t should be orthogonal to FEnt,t+1.
Following Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), we summarize the information in the cross section
of date t yields using five principal components and we estimate the following set of compli-
mentary regressions:
EBR?n,t = α1 + β
>
1 PCs+ εt (8)
rxnt,t+1 = α2 + β
>
2 PCs+ ηt+1 (9)
FEnt,t+1 = α3 + β
>
3 PCs+ νt+1 (10)
where the factor loadings on the forecast errors are mechanically linked by β>3 = β
>
2 −β>1 . Table
VI reports the results for bond maturity n of 10 years. Adjusted R-squared of the regressions
that includes 5 principal components is reported in the R
2
column, while the last column reports
the change in the R-squared when moving from the first 3 PCs to all 5 PCs.
[Insert Table VI here.]
The first line of Table VI shows that a low number of principal components explain a
substantial proportion of the variation in subjective bond risk premia, suggesting the existence
of a strong link between EBR?n,t beliefs and current bond prices. The degree of spanning of
realized returns is smaller and the loadings on the PCs, i.e. β2 in equation (9), are significantly
different from β1 in Equation (9), which implies significant degree of predictability in forecast
errors in the last line of Table VI.
This suggests that even after allowing markets to aggregate beliefs according to Friedman’s
selection argument, bond return expectations do not exploit all available information and pre-
diction errors are not orthogonal even to rather simple type of public information. In order
to address this argument one needs to investigate the economic significance of the predictable
component of these forecast errors.
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A. Economic Significance of Deviation from Rational Expectations
Statistical significance does not necessarily imply economic significance. To study the economic
significance of behavioural components in agents expectations, we design an experiment in
which we construct fictitious bond return expectations by correcting the predictable errors
generated by EBR? using information available in cross-section of date t yields. In this real-time
experiment, we initialise a rolling regression with a window of 5 years of data and recursively
estimate a projection of realised errors on the cross-section of forward spreads.35 The loadings
available in the forecast error regression at date t can only be learned from errors realised one
year earlier. These loadings are then applied to date t forward spreads (F ) in order to build a
‘corrected’ EBR? from the following system
F̂E
n
t−1,t = αˆt−1 + βˆ
>
t−1Ft−1 (11)
ξt = αˆt−1 + βˆ>t−1Ft (12)
ÊBR
?
t = EBR
?
t + ξt (13)
The subscript t in the parameters αˆt−1 and βˆ>t−1 indicates that the correction is restricted to
use only real-time information which is available at time t. The predictable component of the
forecast errors is estimated using a rolling window to replicate real-life conditions of a trader.
We compute and compare the RMSE implied by both the original EBR? and the corrected
ÊBR
?
. We find that, although the initial regressions indicate the existence of predictability
in the forecast errors, the RMSE of the corrected forecasts are unambiguously higher than
the uncorrected ones. For instance, using a rolling window of 5 years in the estimation of the
correction parameters, the RMSE increase by around 17% for the 10-year bond.36 This shows
that the expectations embedded in EBR? cannot be easily improved using market based infor-
mation. The empirical results of this section suggest that even when agents deviate from full
information rationality, the uncorrected version of EBR? dominates its corrected counterpart,
mainly in terms of variability, meaning that the apparent bias in agents beliefs is not easy to
35The space of forward rates or yields spans the space of principal components but avoids computation of the PCs at
each date which introduces unnecessary measurement error in the estimation.
36Figure 4 in the Supplemental Appendix shows the robustness of this finding to alternative window lengths and
different bond maturities. While the magnitude of the corrections do change when varying the size of the window, the
sign of the change and thus the message is robust. Correcting for the predictable component of FEs in real time always
increases the RMSEs while correcting for a constant bias reduces RMSEs.
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correct using information available in real-time. This provides a possible explanation for why
subjective expectation can be persistently different from full information rational expectations
in the long run.
Finally, we note that if one were to correct EBR? for a simple constant bias, obtained from
the mean of the forecast errors over a five year rolling window, the RMSE of the forecast would
decrease by about 13% for the 10-year bond. This could be consistent with either agents having
asymmetric loss functions, which penalize more severely optimistic bond return forecast errors,
or with dogmatic persistent beliefs that imply a sentiment bias, as illustrated in Section III.
Consistent with the last interpretation, we find that the bias correction is highly correlated with
a rolling average of the monthly sentiment proxy over the same rolling windows. Strikingly, for
10-year bond expected excess returns, this correlation is ∼ 89% over the full sample.
VI. Understanding Subjective Bond Risk Premia
In this section we evaluate alternative models for risk premia based on their ability to explain
the dynamics of EBR?n,t, as opposed to projections on future excess returns:
EBR?n,t = a+ b
>Xt + εn,t, (14)
and consider alternative risk factors, Xt, that have been proposed by the literature.
A. Model Specifications
The literature on heterogeneous agents argues risk premia are affected by disagreement which
operates primarily through the quantities of risk channel. Considering the role of disagreement
about real shocks, Buraschi and Whelan (2017) derive bond pricing expressions showing that, if
agents are sufficiently risk tolerant, speculation (disagreement) increases bond risk premia via
a quantity of risk channel. Disagreement about nominal quantities may also matter for bond
risk premia as Ehling, Gallmeyer, Heyerdahl-Larsen, and Illeditsch (2018) show in the context
of a nominal exchange economy. In this case, disagreement about inflation can have real effects
if agents are willing to trade on their beliefs. We proxy for real disagreement (DiB(g)) and
nominal disagreement (DiB(pi)) using the 4-quarter ahead cross-sectional inter-quartile range
in GDP and CPI forecasts from our survey dataset.
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In economies with external habit preferences, e.g. Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Wachter
(2006), and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2007), time variation in risk compensation arises because
of an endogenously time-varying price of risk. Shocks to the current endowment affect the
wedge between consumption and habit, i.e. the consumption surplus, which induces time-
varying expected returns. To obtain a proxy of risk premium Mt, we follow Wachter (2006)
and calculate consumption surplus (Surp) using a weighted average of 10 years of monthly
consumption growth rates: Surp =
∑120
j=1 φ
j∆ct−j, where the weight is set to φ = 0.971/3 to
match the quarterly autocorrelation of the price-dividend ratio in the data.37
In long-run risk economies with recursive preferences (see e.g. Bansal and Yaron (2004)),
time-varying risk premia are driven by economic uncertainty (second moments) of the condi-
tional growth rate of fundamentals. To obtain a proxy for economic uncertainty we adapt the
procedure of Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013). First, we use our survey data on consensus ex-
pectation of 4-quarter GDP growth and inflation and fit a bivariate V AR(1). In a second step,
we compute a GARCH(1,1) process on the VAR residuals to estimate the conditional variance
of expected real growth LRR(g) and expected inflation LRR(pi).
Le and Singleton (2013) discuss the common link between structural models where priced
volatility risks impact expected bond returns. Indeed, the link between volatility risk and
expected returns is a general statement (Merton (1980), French, Schwert, and Stambaugh
(1987)). However, a well established puzzle in the fixed income literature is that this link is not
born out in the data (Duffee (2002)). This has motivated a significant discussion challenging
the ability of completely affine term structure models to explain bond risk premia and calling
for extensions of these specifications. We revisit this link using survey expectations of bond risk
premia and proxy for interest rate volatility using intra-month sum of squared yield changes
(returns) on a constant maturity n-year zero-coupon bonds, which we denote σ̂(n).
Finally, we have shown that there is a systematic behavioural component in agents beliefs.
On average agents have positive forecast errors on excess bond returns which results in a
downward bias in real-time expectations. We linked this bias to optimism about GDP growth
and an upward bias in short rate expectations. Therefore, we ask whether the risk factor proxies
discussed above are linked to subjective bond risk premia, while allowing for a contemporaneous
37We obtain seasonally adjusted, real per-capita consumption of nondurables and services from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
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biases in agents’ beliefs. We do this by controlling for short rate sentiment St in the regressions
of EBR?n,t on the structural risk premium proxies.
38 When controlling for sentiment, we are
explicitly taking into account that subjective risk premia can be driven by both behavioural
and rational elements.
B. Empirical Results
We run a series of multivariate regressions of EBR?t on the state variables implied by the model
specifications above, based on a sample that ranges between December 1993 and July 2015.39
Table VII reports the regression results for 10-year maturity bonds.40
[Insert Table VII here.]
The top two rows report estimates from a regression of EBR?10,t on sentiment: the point
estimate is negative and significant at the 5% level, with a small R-squared of about 4.6%. This
result is consistent with our findings above that there is a slowly moving predictable component
in agents errors resulting from a downward bias in the expectations about bond returns.
The role played by differences in beliefs is reported in specification (I). Consistent with the
prediction of heterogeneous beliefs models both disagreement about real growth and inflation
are positive and significant. In the case of DiB(g) the point estimate is highly significant at the
1% level while DiB(pi) is non significant at the 5% level and the R-squared of the regression is
around 10%. Interestingly, controlling for St the estimate of DiB(g) is unaltered but that of
DiB(pi) rises slightly and the R
2
rises to 16%.
When agents have habit preferences, the price of risk is state-dependent and negatively
related to the consumption surplus ratio. Specification (II) shows that the slope coefficient in
this regression does have the correct sign. However, both the t-statistic and R
2
are rather small:
the t-statistics for the coefficient on Surp is −1.17 and the R-squared is 0.85%. Interestingly,
however, after we take into account the effect of sentiment, the t-statistic on Surp rises to
−1.57 with an R2 of 6.4%.
38GDP sentiment (Sgdpt ) and short rate sentiment (St) are highly correlated at quarterly frequencies but we choose to
use St which is available at the monthly frequency. See Supplemental Appendix F.
39This is the time period for which EBR?n,t is available, since we used an initial window of 5 years for the computation
of past average accuracy percentiles, and there is a lag of 12 months between expectations and realizations.
40Table III in the Supplemental Appendix reports the results for the 5-year maturity bond which are close to the
results for the 10-year bond.
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Specification (III) focuses on the significance of proxies of economic growth and inflation
uncertainty, LRR(g) and LRR(pi), as suggested by long-run risk models. We find that using
EBR?t as dependent variable the statistical significance of inflation uncertainty is quite remark-
able, with a t-statistic equal to 4 for the 10 year bond and an R
2
equal to 19%. Controlling for
St increases the strength of this result both in terms of statistical significant and the regression
R
2
which rises to 29%. Larger values of long-run economic uncertainty about inflation are cor-
related with greater subjective expected bond risk premia. This is consistent, for instance, with
the model discussed in Bansal and Yaron (2004) in which greater uncertainty raises interest
rates, lowers bond prices and increases future expected bond returns. At the same time, the
loading on real uncertainty is economically small and statistically insignificant, regardless of
whether we control for St or not.
Specification (IV) re-examines the link between bond volatility and expected returns. The
regression results show that the quantity of risk channel is significant when tested on EBR?10,t
rather than realisations. The R-squared is quite high, around 18%, and the t-statistic of 7.18 is
highly significant. Importantly, the point estimate is also positive consistent with theory that
predicts investors demand compensation for holding volatility risk. Controlling for sentiment
raises the R2 to about 29% while both factor loadings remain highly statistically significant.
This result is interesting in its own right since it suggests that term structure models in which
the quantity of risk plays a role should not be dismissed.
To summarize, these findings show empirical proxies implied by equilibrium models explain
the dynamics of subjective bond risk premia. Moreover, consistent with rational pricing of risk,
we document a positive significant link between EBR?10,t and bond volatility. This result con-
trasts with previous studies for equity returns which argue that equilibrium models generate
implied risk premia that correlate negatively with survey-implied risk premia. For instance,
Greenwood and Schleifer (2014) use equity market data and find a negative correlation be-
tween model-implied equity risk premia and survey expectations. They interpret their result as
clear evidence of a rejection of rational expectations models: ‘We can reject this hypothesis with
considerable confidence. This evidence is inconsistent with the view that expectations of stock
market returns reflect the beliefs or requirements of a representative investor in a rational expec-
tations model.’ However, we also find a significant role for a behavioural component in investors
beliefs, as captured by a real-time proxy for sentiment. This is an important point: when dis-
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tinguishing between behavioural and rational theories of financial economics, one should not
dismiss these channels as being mutually exclusive. Indeed, the findings here suggest that both
are driving subjective bond risk premia.
VII. Conclusion
This paper studies the expectations of bond returns reveiled by survey data and compares them
to traditional measures of bond risk premia and ex-post realizations. Our analysis reveals a
number of novel results.
First, we show that individual subjective bond risk premia are heterogeneous and that form-
ing consensus average beliefs disregards important information in the cross-section of beliefs.
Agents disagree on whether bonds provide insurance or are risky bets on the state of economy.
Moreover, we document significant persistence in agents beliefs about bond expected returns.
This translates into significant persistence in the rankings of different agents for their accuracy
in predicting long-term bond returns.
Second, when we compare beliefs about short-term and long-term bonds, we find that the
most accurate agents at forecasting the long end of the term structure are not the best in
predicting short-term rates. This finding supports the idea that time variation in bond risk
premia plays an important role in the predictability of long-term bond returns.
Third, we formally test and clearly reject both full-information rational expectations and
weaker versions of rational expectations with information frictions. We show that agents dis-
play a systematically optimistic behaviour a that a distorted Kalman filter matches well their
expectation formation. These tests take advantage of individual specific beliefs information
that allows us to avoid the biases and confounding effects of consensus data.
Fourth, we explicitly address Friedman (1953) conjecture that market competition drives
resources to agents with (more) rational beliefs. We construct an aggregate measure of subjec-
tive bond risk premia based on past accuracy which we denote as EBR?. Using this measure
we show that while forecast errors are predictable in a statistical sense they are not easy to
correct economically in real time.
Finally, we give an application of EBR? in the context of the evaluation of structural models.
Instead of using average future realized returns as the dependent variable, we use EBR? and
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compare a series of alternative models proposed in the literature. We find support for both
behavioural and rational determinants of bond risk premia. In particular, we demonstrate the
importance of controlling for agents sentiment in models in which the time variation of risk
premia depend on the interaction of the prices and quantities of risks.
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VIII. Tables
3-month rate 2-year bond 10-year bond
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 72% 21% 5% 1% 75% 19% 4% 2% 74% 18% 5% 2%
Q2 22% 51% 23% 4% 20% 51% 23% 5% 21% 52% 22% 5%
Q3 5% 21% 54% 19% 4% 23% 52% 20% 5% 23% 52% 20%
Q4 2% 5% 22% 71% 1% 5% 22% 71% 1% 5% 22% 71%
Table I. Transition Probabilities
Probability of a forecaster transitioning from a given quartile of the cross-sectional distribution of 3-month yield
(left), 2-year bond excess returns (middle) and 10-year bond excess returns (right) forecasts to another quartile
in the following month.
WORST CONS BEST Slope CP
Panel A: Full Sample
ALL 10.56 8.60 7.75 7.71 9.37
Expansions 10.82 8.89 8.01 7.99 9.09
Recessions 8.19 5.73 5.15 5.04 11.37
Panel B: Excluding ZLB
ALL 9.77 8.03 7.28 8.06 9.63
Expansions 9.88 8.26 7.51 8.38 9.37
Recessions 7.95 4.83 3.99 4.18 10.58
Table II. Accuracy of Survey Forecasts vs Slope vs CP
Root mean square prediction errors for 10-year bond excess returns, based on forecasts from the unconditional
worst 10 forecasters (WORST), the best 10 forecasters (BEST), and the simple average of survey expectations
(CONS). The top panel reports RMSEs for all months in the sample period covering January 1988 to July 2015
(331 observations), and the bottom panel excludes the zero lower bound subsample January 2009 to July 2015
(leaving 253 observations). Recessions report RMSEs coming from forecasts made during NBER recessions (37
observations in the top panel, 18 in the bottom panel) and Expansions report RMSEs for all other dates.
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3M 10Y 3M vs 10Y
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 64% 25% 7% 2% 58% 27% 11% 4% 34% 26% 22% 17%
Q2 22% 48% 24% 5% 25% 44% 24% 7% 25% 32% 26% 17%
Q3 8% 21% 48% 22% 9% 22% 47% 21% 19% 25% 32% 24%
Q4 3% 5% 19% 72% 5% 7% 19% 70% 17% 16% 21% 47%
Table III. Accuracy Transition Probabilities
The left panel presents the probability of a forecaster transitioning from a given quartile of the cross-sectional
distribution of forecasts’ accuracy to another quartile in the following month, for 3-month interest rates. The
middle panel presents the same transition probabilities of 10-year bond excess return accuracy. The right panel
presents the conditional distribution of forecast accuracy for the 10-year EBR given the 3-month yield accuracy,
that is the probability that a forecaster is in a given quartile of the 10-year EBR accuracy percentile distribution
knowing that the forecaster is in a given quartile of the 3-month yield accuracy percentile distribution.
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Top 10-year Bond Forecasters Top Short Rate Forecasters
(1) Thredgold Economic Assoc. Goldman Sachs
(2) UBS GLC Financial Economics
(3) Goldman Sachs RidgeWorth Capital Management
(4) Huntington National Bank Economist Intelligence Unit
(5) Fleet Financial Group Tucker Anthony, Inc.
(6) RidgeWorth Capital Management J.P. Morgan
(7) Fannie Mae BMO Capital Markets
(8) DePrince & Assoc Societe´ Generale
(9) J.W. Coons & Assoc Aubrey G. Lanston & Co.
(10) Nomura Securities Inc. Nomura Securities Inc.
Table IV. Top 10 Forecasters
The left panel of this table presents the top 10 forecasters in terms of average accuracy percentile ranking for
the 10-year bond excess returns, over the full sample. The right panel shows the top 10 short rate forecasters
in terms of average accuracy percentile ranking over the full sample, for the 3-month yield. We consider only
forecasters who contribute to the panel for at least 5 years.
Most Represented in EBR*
(1) Fannie Mae
(2) Nomura Securities Inc.
(3) DePrince & Assoc
(4) Cycledata Corp
(5) Loomis Sayles & Co
(6) Bank of America Securities
(7) Keller Economic Advisers
(8) Thredgold Economic Assoc.
(9) Goldman Sachs
(10) The Northern Trust Company
Table V. Who is in EBR??
This table shows the 10 agents who are more often (in terms of number of months) present in our EBR? index,
which conditionally selects the top half of forecasters based on past accuracy percentiles on the 10-year bond
excess returns. Sample period is December 1993 - July 2015.
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Maturity constant PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 R
2
∆R
2
EBR?10,t 0.92 1.50 1.40 1.05 −0.45 −0.56 39.30 3.99
(2.51) (4.36) (4.97) (3.97) (1.32) (−2.20)
rx10t+1 4.76 1.38 3.61 −0.15 1.51 −2.24 32.66 13.64
(5.39) (1.74) (4.29) (−0.18) (2.94) (−3.40)
FE10t+1 3.84 −0.12 2.21 −1.19 1.96 −1.68 21.15 11.47
(3.77) (−0.13) (2.42) (−1.38) (3.53) (−2.39)
Table VI. Expected Returns, Realized Returns, and Forecast Error Predictability
Estimates from regressions of subjective expected returns (EBR?10,t), realized returns (rx
10
t+1) and forecast errors
(FE10t+1) on the principal components of yields (PCs), for a 10-year bond. t-statistics, reported in parentheses
below the point estimates, are Newey-West corrected. Adjusted R-squared of the regressions that includes 5
principle components is reported in the R
2
column. The final column reports the change in the R-squared when
moving from the first 3 PCs to all 5 PCs. The sample period is from December 1993 to July 2015.
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S DiB(g) DiB(pi) Surp LRR(g) LRR(pi) σ̂ R2
−0.22 4.60
(−2.66)
(I) 0.24 0.11 9.85
(2.51) (1.30)
−0.26 0.24 0.15 16.35
(−3.35) (2.49) (1.76)
(II) −0.11 0.85
(−1.17)
−0.25 −0.15 6.41
(−3.01) (−1.57)
(III) 0.07 0.41 19.20
(0.95) (4.0)
−0.33 −0.02 0.52 29.02
(−4.87) (−0.31) (5.08)
(IV) 0.43 18.39
(7.18)
−0.33 0.50 28.89
(−4.43) (7.30)
Table VII. Determinants of Ex-Ante Subjective Bond Returns
Estimates from regressions of the subjective expected excess returns on 10-year bonds on a set of explanatory
variables:
EBR?10,t = a+ b
>Xt + 10,t.
These factors are discussed in detail in the main body of the paper and all variables are standardized. t-
statistics, reported in parentheses below the point estimates, are Newey-West corrected. Adjusted R-squared of
the regressions are reported in the last column. The sample period is from December 1993 to July 2015.
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Figure 1. Subjective Expectations
The top panel plots quartiles (Q1, Q2(median) and Q3) of the cross-sectional distribution of 1-year subjective
expected excess returns for 10-year maturity bonds. The bottom panel plots disagreement about expected bond
returns for maturities 2, 5 and 10-year, defined as the cross-sectional interquartile range of subjective expectations
standardized by the full-sample consensus expectation.
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Figure 2. Predictive Regressions Individual Forecasters
Estimated regression coefficients and adjusted R2 of regressions of the realized excess 10-year bond returns on
the expected excess bond returns for all individual contributors with at least 60 months of forecasts:
rx10t+1 = α
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i + β
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i erx
10
i,t + 
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Figure 3. Relative Accuracy
Histograms of the relative accuracy A10i of each forecaster, that is, the ratio between the RMSE of each individual
forecaster and the RMSE of a benchmark, for 10-year bond excess returns. The benchmark models we consider
are a real-time forecast implied the slope (10-year yield minus 1-year yield) or the CP factor, for the period in
which the forecaster is in the panel. We consider only the contributors with at least 60 months of forecasts, for
a total of 84 institutions.
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Figure 4. Full Information and Noisy RE Tests
The top left panel shows the t-statistics for the slope coefficient of a regression of individual forecast errors on forecast revisions, for the 10-year excess bond
return, focusing on the 84 agents with at least 60 monthly forecasts. The top right (bottom left) panel shows the t-statistics for the slope coefficient of a
regression of individual forecast errors (forecast revisions) on their lagged values. The bottom right panel shows histograms of t-statistics of the slope coefficients
of a regression of forecast errors on sentiment. Sentiment is estimated on growth sentiment, Sgdpt , where t is measured in quarters rather than months since
GDP growth data are available only at quarterly frequency.
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Figure 5. Realized vs Expected Returns
Realized versus expected excess returns for a 5-year (left panel) and a 10-year (right panel) bond. Realized returns are lined up with expectations, i.e., the
black line indicates excess returns that will be realised in 1 year.
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Figure 6. Spanning Tests of Alternative Aggregate Measures.
Differences in R2 of contemporaneous 60-months rolling regressions of EBR+ and EBR? on the cross-section of
bond prices, summarized by the principal components of the term structure of interest rates. EBR+ is obtained
using the beliefs of the unrestricted agents with positive expected bond excess returns; EBR? is based on the
beliefs of the top half forecasters based on past accuracy.
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A. Summary Statistics
Table I provides summary statistics for the median, the first quartile and the third quartile of
the cross-sectional distribution of 1-year expected excess bond returns (EBR) for maturities of
2, 5 and 10 years.
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the quartiles of the cross-sectional distribution of macroe-
conomic and short rate forecasts and the level of disagreement, defined as the cross-sectional
interquartile range of subjective expectations standardized by the full-sample consensus expec-
tation. As we compare macro versus short-rate expectations, subjective expectations appear
consistent with a Taylor rule relationship. For example, between the years 1988 and 1990 agents
expected inflation to increase. At the same time forecasters expected the Federal Reserve to
increase short term rates and that this policy would have a contractionary effect on the real
economy (GDP growth).
1
Q1 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year
Mean −0.03 −0.95 −1.66
Std Dev 0.00 0.02 0.03
Min −0.01 −0.06 −0.10
Max 0.01 0.03 0.11
Skew −0.06 −0.09 0.01
Kurtosis 2.49 2.67 3.17
1st Lag Auto 0.79 0.75 0.74
Q2 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year
Mean 0.28 0.34 1.06
Std Dev 0.00 0.02 0.03
Min −0.01 −0.04 −0.08
Max 0.02 0.04 0.12
Skew 0.05 −0.06 −0.03
Kurtosis 2.34 2.70 3.07
1st Lag Auto 0.82 0.75 0.76
Q3 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year
Mean 0.56 1.46 3.57
Std Dev 0.01 0.02 0.04
Min −0.01 −0.03 −0.05
Max 0.02 0.06 0.15
Skew 0.23 −0.02 0.04
Kurtosis 2.11 2.51 2.68
1st Lag Auto 0.86 0.78 0.79
Table I. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics of the first (Q1), second (Q2) and third (Q3) quartiles of the distribution of
subjective expected excess bond returns, for maturities of 2, 5 and 10 years, and forecast horizon of 1
year. Sample period is January 1988 to July 2015 (331 observations).
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Figure 1. Subjective Expectations
The first three panels plot quartiles (Q1, Q2(median) and Q3) of the cross-sectional distribution
of 1-year expectations of 3-month treasury yield forecasts (top left panel), GDP growth (top right
panel) and CPI growth (bottom panel). The bottom right panel plots disagreement about 3-month
Treasury yields, GDP and CPI growth, defined as the cross-sectional interquartile range of subjective
expectations standardized by the full-sample consensus expectation.
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B. Internally Consistent Beliefs
Since we know the identity of each forecaster on both future interest rates and future state of
the economy (GDP growth and inflation), we can ask whether these are mutually consistent.
We find that agents who are marginally more optimistic or pessimistic about macroeconomic
variables are consistently in one particular quartile of the cross-sectional distribution of short
term interest rates, as shown in Table II. If one focuses on the corners of this table, we find
that analysts who forecast lower short-term interest rates are also those forecasting lower GDP
growth and, at the same time, lower CPI inflation. For instance, 35% of those who are in
the first quartile of the distribution of future short-term interest rate forecasts are also in the
first quartile of the distribution for GDP growth forecasts; similarly, 41% of those who are in
the first quartile of the distribution of future short-term interest rate forecasts are also in the
first quartile of the distribution for CPI inflation forecasts. This relation between forecasts at
the individual level is consistent with the idea that good states of the economy are generally
characterised by increasing yields, at least at short maturity. At the same time, the pattern is
not deterministic, suggesting that beliefs on interest rates and the macroeconomy (GDP and
inflation) are not driven by a single factor.
GDP CPI
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 35% 26% 22% 16% 41% 26% 21% 11%
Q2 26% 27% 28% 19% 26% 30% 28% 16%
Q3 22% 26% 29% 23% 20% 23% 31% 27%
Q4 20% 22% 25% 33% 15% 20% 26% 39%
Table II. Conditional Probabilities Short Rates vs Macro
This table presents the probability of a forecaster being in a given quartile of the cross-sectional
distribution of Macro forecasts (GDP growth on the left and Inflation on the right) given that the
forecaster is in a particular quartile of the cross-sectional distribution of 3 month yield forecasts.
C. State Dependence in the Difference in Accuracy
This appendix studies whether the differences in forecast accuracy for the 3-month yield, and
the bias between top and bottom forecasters, discussed in Section III of the main text, are
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state dependent. Figure 2 shows the difference in the absolute error between forecasters in
the top decile and two benchmarks, namely the consensus forecast and the expectation from
the unit root model. Negative values occur when the top forecasters are more accurate than
the benchmark. Independent of the benchmark used, we can statistically reject at the 5%
confidence level the null hypothesis that the difference is constant. Moreover, we find that the
top forecasters are more accurate than the consensus in 1990-1993, 2001-2003, and 2008-2011.
All these periods are recessions and are characterized by important changes in the stance of the
monetary policy.
Figure 2. Absolute Short Rate Error Differences
Differences in absolute forecast errors between the the top decile of forecasters and the consensus, and
the top decile and a unit root forecast.
To analyze in further detail this result and whether it is due to the use of ex-post ranking
information, we compare the time series of average accuracy percentiles for primary dealers
(PDs) versus all other contributors (NPDs). As we expected, we find clear evidence that the
comparative advantage of PDs is stronger in recession periods. Namely, the average expectation
errors for PDs and NPDs diverge significantly in the early 90s, in the early 2000s and during
the recent financial crisis. These periods are all characterized by a change of monetary policy
in which the Fed has aggressively reduced the short term rate. While these decisions seem to
take by surprise the consensus agent, whose expected short rates are biased upward in these
subperiods, primary dealers are significantly more accurate, and this is especially true during
5
the recent financial crisis.
To investigate these differences formally, we split the sample in two parts to capture persis-
tent periods of increasing and decreasing interest rates, respectively. We compute the exponen-
tial moving average of the monthly change in the fed fund rate over the previous 12 months.1
Considering the whole sample, there are 195 months in which this exponential moving average
of changes is negative and 113 in which it is positive. We then recompute the average accu-
racy percentiles for each individual forecaster explicitly distinguishing these two time periods
and we compare the distribution of accuracy percentiles for top and bottom forecasters using
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The null hypothesis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is that the
accuracy percentiles of top and bottom are drawn from the same distribution. Unconditionally
(considering the full sample), the p-value of the test is 15%, which implies that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis. However, in the subperiod in which the Fed has been more active
in conducting a dovish policy on the short term rate, the p-value of the test is 1.61%. In these
sub-periods we can strongly reject the hypothesis that accuracy percentiles of top and bottom
forecasters are drawn from the same distribution. On the other hand, the p-value of the test
in periods of increasing fed fund rate is 47.75%, suggesting that the distribution of accuracy is
very similar in these periods. A Mann-Whitney U-test for the difference in medians between the
accuracy percentile distributions yields similar results: unconditionally the p-value is 4.98%,
in periods of increasing rates it is 58.99%, and in periods of decreasing rates it is 0.80%. We
repeat these test using the ex-ante classification of PDs versus NPDs and we obtain the same
conclusions.
D. Why are Primary Dealers better at Predicting the Short Rate?
The fact that PDs are much better than other institutions at predicting the short rate precisely
during inflection points, e.g. turns of business cycles when the Fed turns dovish by reducing the
interest rate, is rather intriguing. It is potentially consistent with these institutions either being
better in forecasting economic fundamentals, having specific information about the stance of
the monetary policy, or having useful order flow information on short-term bonds. Since we
have named forecasts also on economic fundamentals, we test the first hypothesis by comparing
1Results are robust to the choice of time periods for the moving average.
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the accuracy of top versus bottom short-rate forecasters about future real economic growth and
inflation (see Figure 3). We find that top forecasters do not perform better than other agents in
forecasting the inputs of the Taylor rule, i.e. inflation and GDP growth.2 In fact, if anything,
the accuracy of top forecasters’ inflation expectations is lower, with an average accuracy ranking
of 0.57 versus 0.42 for bottom forecasters (see bottom panels of Figure 2). Similarly, the GDP
growth accuracy is worse for the top short rate forecasters, at 0.56 versus 0.51, respectively.
Moreover, despite the time variation, the top short-rate forecasters (the great majority of which
are primary dealers) are virtually never more accurate than the worse short-rate forecasters in
predicting either inflation or real GDP growth. Indeed, the best macro forecasters on average
are institutions like Action Economics and ClearView Economics; primary dealers such as
Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan and Nomura are consistently in the worst half of growth and
inflation forecast accuracy.
This suggests that either order flow information in fixed income markets plays an important
role for the precision of interest rate forecasts, or primary dealers have specific information
about (or better models to interpret) monetary policy.
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Figure 3. Macro Accuracy Percentiles
Time series of average accuracy percentiles on the Real GDP growth (left) and CPI growth (right), for
the top and bottom decile short rate forecasters.
2Note that realized GDP growth is available only quarterly. Therefore, the time series of GDP growth
accuracy is also quarterly.
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E. Kalman Filter with Sentiment
Assume the state variable xt is a measure of economic growth or of the state of the economy
and is latent. The observable variable yt in the filter represents the level of yields or another
variable that the agents are trying to forecast.
Assume also that the true expected yield is xt + zt while the agents ignore zt and think the
expected yield is just xt. zt represents a measure of sentiment, which is common to all agents
i.3
The transition and measurement equations under the measure of the econometrician are as
follows:
xt+1 = a0 + a1xt + ε
x
t+1, (1)
zt+1 = b0 + b1z
i
t + ε
z
t+1, (2)
yt = xt + zt + wt,
(3)
while agents ignore z, i.e. their expectations are biased, and believe
yt = xt + wt.
Assume for simplicity the moment that the two state variables x and z are independent.4
A. Steps of the filter
• Initialize at the unconditional mean and variance of the state:
x0|0 =
a0
1− a1
P x0|0 = σ
2
εx
z0|0 =
b0
1− b1
P z0|0 = σ
2
εz
3A positive value of zt implies that the agents expect a lower yield than the econometrician and be interpreted
as pessimism.
4Results can be easily extended to the case of correlated state innovations.
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The initial value of the x state for the agent is also xi0|0 =
a0
1−a1 .
• Time-update equations:
For the agents:
xit|t−1 = a0 + a1x
i
t−1|t−1. (4)
P xt|t−1 = a
2
1P
x
t−1|t−1 + σ
2
εx . (5)
For the econometrician:
xt|t−1 = a0 + a1xt−1|t−1. (6)
zt|t−1 = a0 + a1zt−1|t−1 (7)
P xt|t−1 = a
2
1P
x
t−1|t−1 + σ
2
εx (8)
P zt|t−1 = a
2
1P
z
t−1|t−1 + σ
2
εz . (9)
• Prediction error and variance of the measurement equation:
The yield forecast of the agent is yˆit|t−1 − xit|t−1 while the econometrician’s forecast is
y˜t|t−1 − xt|t−1 − zt|t−1. Therefore, their prediction errors are given by:
ηit = yt − xit|t−1, (10)
η˜t = yt − xt|t−1 − zt|t−1, (11)
with variances
St = P
x
t|t−1 + σ
2
w, (12)
S˜t = P
x
t|t−1 + P
z
t|t−1 + σ
2
w, (13)
respectively.
• Update filtering:
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The Kalman gain for the agent is
Kit = P
x
t|t−1(St)
−1 =
P xt|t−1
P xt|t−1 + σ
2
w
. (14)
The Kalman gain for the econometrician has two components, corresponding to the signal
to noise ratios of the two states:
K˜1,t =
P xt|t−1
P xt|t−1 + P
z
t|t−1 + σ
2
w
, (15)
K˜2,t =
P zt|t−1
P xt|t−1 + P
z
t|t−1 + σ
2
w
. (16)
Note that
Kit = K˜1,t
(
1 +
P zt|t−1
P xt|t−1 + σ
2
w
)
= K˜1,t(1 + θt|t−1), (17)
which means that the agent has an inflated Kalman gain since he interprets the divergence
between yields and x due to sentiment as an additional prediction error in x that he tries
to correct.5
The updated state for the agent is thus:
xit|t = x
i
t|t−1 +K
i
tη
i
t, (18)
while for the econometrician the update is:
xt|t = xt|t−1 + K˜1,tη˜t, (19)
st|t = st|t−1 + K˜2,tη˜t, (20)
Combining (18) and (4) we can also write:
xit+1|t = a0 + a1x
i
t|t−1 + a
i
1K
i
tη
i
t. (21)
5Note that the effect could be reversed if the states x and z are positively correlated and this correlation is
strong enough to offset the effect of θ. In this case, the agent would observe a smaller prediction error when x
is large and therefore under-react to the shock.
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Combining (18) with (17) we get:
xit|t = x
i
t|t−1 + K˜1,t(1 + θt|t−1)η
i
t
xit|t = x
i
t|t−1 + K˜1,t(1 + θt|t−1)
[
η˜t − (xit|t−1 − xt|t−1) + st|t−1
]
. (22)
This expression resembles the case of diagnostic expectations in Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma
and Shleifer (2018), in which agents overstate the impact of news by the multiplicative factor
θ. However, in this setting we also have a bias in the perceived prediction error, that includes
the current level of sentiment and the difference between the agent’s estimated state and the
econometrician’s, which is a function of past levels of sentiment and past shocks.
The difference between the agent-specific and the rational forecasts of the state can be
written as:
xit+1|t − xt+1|t = a1Kit η˜t + a1Kitst|t−1 + a1
(
1−Kit
)
(xit|t−1 − xt|t−1). (23)
Since this difference appears also in the forecast errors and forecast revisions, for convenience
let us denote it by dt+1|t ≡ xit+1|t − xt+1|t. Its unconditional mean is
E(d) =
a1K
i
1− a1(1−Ki)E(z),
where E(z) = b0
1−b1 and K
i is the steady-state Kalman gain of the agent.
B. Forecast Revisions
Forecast revisions can be written as follows:
FRit = x
i
t+1|t − xit+1|t−1
= a0 + a1x
i
t|t−1 + a1K
i
tη
i
t − a0 − a1xit|t−1
= a1K
i
tη
i
t (24)
= a1K˜1,t(1 + θt|t−1)
(
η˜t − dt|t−1 + zt|t−1
)
. (25)
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Note that since the agents are biased the prediction errors ηit do not have mean zero.
In fact, the unconditional mean of the forecast errors is:
E(FR) =
a1(1− a1)Ki
1− a1(1−Ki)E(z),
which has the same sign of the mean sentiment if 0 < a1 < 1. In the data, agents seem to
overestimate yields, which implies a negative z and therefore the mean yield forecast error
should be negative and the mean excess return forecast error should be positive.
Equation (25) implies that forecast revisions FRit are positively linked to sentiment zt|t−1,
with regression coefficient a1K˜1,t(1 + θt|t−1), assuming that the persistence of the state variable
a1 is positive and noting that the Kalman gain is a number between zero and one.
Equation (25) also implies that forecast revisions are persistent, given the persistence of d
and z.
C. Forecast errors
The forecast error for agent i is given by:
FEit,t+1 = yt+1 − xit+1|t
= η˜t+1 − dt+1|t + zt+1|t (26)
(27)
The coefficient on current sentiment zt+1|t is positive but FE depends negatively on past
values of sentiment through dt+1|t.
The unconditional mean of the forecast errors is given by:
E(FE) =
1− a1
1− a1(1−Ki)E(z) =
E(FR)
a1Ki
. (28)
As for the forecast revisions, assuming b0 < 0 and 0 < a1 < 1, the (time series) average yield
forecast error will be negative for all agents, and (26) implies a persistent forecast error.
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D. Forecast error on forecast revision
Inserting the expression for the forecast revision in the forecast error (26) and using the dy-
namics of z and d we get:
FEit,t+1 = b0 +
(
b1
a1Kit
− 1
)
FRit + f(lagged sentiment) + f(current and past shocks) (29)
Therefore, the coefficient of the forecast error on the forecast revision is negative, as in the
data, if sentiment is not too persistent, i.e. b1 < a1K
i
t . However, this regression in the data
might suffer from endogeneity since the independent variable FRit is correlated with the shocks.
F. Empirical Measures of Sentiment
To investigate the biases in beliefs and their dynamics, we construct a measure of forecaster’s
sentiment. In the general equilibrium literature with heterogeneous beliefs, Sentiment is de-
fined as the deviation between agents beliefs about fundamental growth and the expecta-
tion of an unbiased econometrician. We use agent-specific expectations on one-year GDP
growth, Eit (gdpt+1), and compare them to the expectation implied by a benchmark model,
E (gdpt+1|Mt). To compute one-year model forecasts under the econometrician measure Mt,
we borrow from the empirical macro-finance literature and use a time-series AR(4) model
using quarterly realized GDP growth. Our measure of growth sentiment is then the differ-
ence between the survey and model-implied expectation of GDP growth for the average agent:
Sgdpt = Eit (gdpt+1)− E (gdpt+1|Mt), for i equal to the consensus. Positive values of sentiment
Sgdpt correspond to an average optimism in subjective beliefs about growth with respect to an
econometrician.
This measure of GDP growth sentiment Sgdpt however is only available at quarterly fre-
quency. Therefore, we also construct an alternative measure of sentiment St that is available
monthly, based on 3-month rate forecasts: St = Eit
(
y3mt+1
) − E (y3mt+1|Mt) for i equal to the
consensus agent. This measure captures the average optimism in subjective beliefs about short
rates with respect to an econometrician, whose expectations are assumed to follow a benchmark
unit-root model. Figure 4 shows that the two measures of sentiment, St and Sgdpt , are highly
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correlated, which is consistent with sentiment in bond markets to be related to agents’ beliefs
about the dynamics of fundamentals.6 The largest deviations between individual forecasts and
model-implied ones, i.e. the highest values of sentiment, seem to occur in the early 90s, in the
early 2000s, and during the recent financial crisis, and these periods coincide with the largest
GDP contractions in our sample.7
Our results suggest that there is a systematic behavioral component in agents beliefs. Agents
are optimistic on average in our sample (i.e. sentiment tends to be positive) and this drives an
average positive forecast errors on bond excess returns, as shown in the paper.
6This is consistent with theoretical models in which the source of the ex-ante expectation bias is driven by
sentiment in the endowment growth. While GDP growth sentiment is more intuitively linked to the consumption
growth sentiment of these models, we focus on the short-rate sentiment St as an explanatory variable for bond
risk premia in section VI of the paper, since it is available monthly instead of quarterly.
7These results are related to the work of Cieslak (2016), who shows that ‘entering recessions, agents sys-
tematically overestimate the future real rate and underestimate unemployment. These forecast errors induce a
predictable component in realized bond excess returns’ .
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Figure 4. Sentiment Measures
The blue line denotes the Sentiment measure, computed as the difference between the simple average
of expected GDP growth from surveys and the expected GDP growth implied by an AR(4) projection
of quarterly realized GDP growth. The red line is an equivalent measure of sentiment on short rate
expectations, available monthly, where the physical expectation is computed from a unit-root forecast
at 1-year horizon. Bottom is a scatter plot corresponding to the time series in the top plot.
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G. Additional Results
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Figure 5. Change in RMSE correcting EBR?
Differences in root mean square errors between the corrected ÊBR
?
and the original EBR?, as a
function of the rolling window length used in the correction estimation, for bond maturities of 2, 5 and
10 years. In the top panel, the correction is based on a projection of the forecast errors realized over
the rolling window on forward spreads. In the bottom panel, we correct EBR? only by the average
realized forecast errors over the rolling windows.
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S DiB(g) DiB(pi) Surp LRR(g) LRR(pi) σ̂ R2
−0.26 6.46
(−3.10)
(I) 0.05 0.12 2.44
(0.60) (1.51)
−0.29 0.05 0.17 10.54
(−3.49) (0.58) (2.03)
(II) −0.04 −0.25
(−0.56)
−0.27 −0.08 6.74
(−3.27) (−1.15)
(III) −0.04 0.29 6.88
(−0.61) (2.39)
−0.36 −0.14 0.41 18.54
(−4.81) (−2.04) (3.35)
(IV) 0.23 5.21
(3.46)
−0.38 0.35 17.98
(−4.24) (4.84)
Table III. Determinants of Ex-Ante Subjective Bond Returns
Estimates from regressions of the subjective expected excess returns on 5-year bonds on a set of
explanatory variables:
EBR?5,t = a+ b
>Xt + 5,t.
These factors are discussed in detail in the main body of the paper and all variables are standardized.
t-statistics, reported in parentheses below the point estimates, are Newey-West corrected. Adjusted
R-squared of the regressions are reported in the last column. The sample period is from December
1993 to July 2015.
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